




Performance persistence of Dutch pension plans








Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Huang, X., & Mahieu, R. J. (2012). Performance persistence of Dutch pension plans. De Economist, 160(1), 17-
34. https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10645-011-9176-3
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Performance Persistence of Dutch Pension Funds
Xiaohong Huang
School of Management and Governance, University of Twente,
Drienerlolaan 5, 7522 NB Enschede, the Netherlands.
Tel: +31 53 489 3458, Fax: +31 53 489 2159.
E-mail: x.huang@utwente.nl
Ronald Mahieu
Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University,
and
Netspar




This paper studies the investment performance of pension funds with a focus on their ability
in implementing their intended investment strategy. We use a sample of Dutch industry-wide
pension funds, which are obliged by law to report their investment performance according to the
so-called z-score. The z-score is a risk-adjusted performance measure with benchmark settings
predefined by Dutch law. We find that pension funds as a group cannot beat their self-selected
benchmarks consistently. Applying a cross-sectional portfolio approach we find evidence that
the largest pension funds outperform the smallest funds.
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The aggregated market value of Dutch pension fund portfolios is large. At the end of year 2008 the
total asset size of Dutch pension funds was e605 billion. This number is 1.2 times larger than the
value of the GDP, which was e488.5 billion in 2008. In contrast, the assets managed by collective
investment schemes such as mutual funds and hedge funds, are only about e84 billion.1 Most of
these pension assets are associated to industry-related pension funds (e409 billion), which manage
the pension savings for the majority of Dutch employees. The sheer size of this category of pension
funds and their significant role in providing retirement income warrants a careful investigation of
the performance of their investment portfolios.
In the Netherlands a mandatory industry-wide pension fund is a multi-sponsor pension plan
that provides pension services to all employees of the companies affiliated to a particular industry2.
Employees of these companies are obliged to participate in these schemes. The mandatory feature
of these plans leads to a legal requirement that pension funds should report their investment
performance in terms of a so-called z-score, a risk-adjusted measure of their investment returns. The
z-score methodology is fixed by Dutch law (Vrijstellingsbesluit Wet Bpf (2000)). Most importantly,
the prescribed risk adjustment is not consistent with ex post risk exposure. If a fund fails a
performance test based on the z-score, it loses its mandatory status. Individual participating
companies can then leave the fund and either join another pension fund or establish their own
fund.
In this paper, we use a unique data set of z-score observations to provide a cross-sectional and
longitudinal description of the investment performance of Dutch mandatory industry-wide pension
funds. Our study adds to the current literature on pension fund performance. It provides another
piece of evidence that pension funds do not add value in implementing investment strategies with
respect to the indicated benchmarks. Our study also shows the variation in performance across
funds of different sizes, revealing that the biggest fund group persistently outperform smallest fund
group. This finding corroborates the ongoing consolidation in the pension fund sector.
1According to statistics on the website of the Dutch central bank (DNB): www.dnb.nl.
2According to statistics from the Dutch central bank (DNB), in 2010 about 88% of the industry-wide funds provide
defined benefit schemes and the rest are defined contribution and mixed schemes.
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Pension fund performance is often measured by the total investment return of the fund portfolio,
which is in general determined by the strategic asset allocation and the implementation of this
allocation. The strategic allocation is typically set by the trustees with the help of consultants
and investment advisors. The implementation of the strategic portfolio is delegated to internal or
external asset managers with different specializations.3 Our paper focuses on the quality of the
implementation, and this is measured by the fund’s overall portfolio performance in excess of an a
priori agreed-upon benchmark portfolio.
A pension fund portfolio typically consists of various asset classes. The study on investment
performance can be performed at both the individual asset class level as well as at the level of the
overall fund portfolio. One stream of the literature is evaluating the performance on an asset class
level, such as Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny (1992), Coggin, Fabozzi & Rahman (1993), Busse,
Goyal & Wahal (2006), Tonks (2005) and Bauer, Frehen, Lum & Otten (2007). The other stream
of the literature, which is relatively small, is related to performance evaluation at the overall fund
level. ? and Ippolito & Turner (1987) are the pioneers in this line of research. A most recent
paper is Blake, Lehmann & Timmermann (1999) on UK pension funds. Our paper fits in this
second stream of literature and addresses the question whether pension funds outperform their
benchmarks using the z-score framework. In that way our study adds to the limited, but growing,
literature on pension fund investment performance. The lack of empirical studies on pension fund
investment performance up to now may be related to the fact that there is little detailed information
available on the asset allocations and on the returns of individual components of the pension fund
investment portfolios.4 The Dutch sample used in our study overcomes this problem, and provides
a risk-adjusted measurement that accounts for fund- and period- specific asset allocations and
returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe previous studies on
pension fund investment performance. Section 3 provides some background on the investment
3A new trend is that an external investment firm acts as a fiduciary asset manager, who structures and monitors
the total investment process from strategic asset allocation to individual asset manager selection.
4There is some information on asset holdings of pension funds and these data are used to test the determinants of
investment policies empirically, such as Alestalo & Puttonen (2006), Gerber & Weber (2007) and Bikker & de Dreu
(2009). The lack of returns on individual asset classes, however, limits these authors from more detailed evaluations
on investment performance.
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processes at Dutch pension funds, and introduces the z-score in detail. Section 4 describes the
associated data. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
In this part we provide an overview of the most important papers on pension fund performance
evaluation at the overall fund level. ? and Ippolito & Turner (1987) are the pioneers in this line of
research. A more recent paper is Blake et al. (1999) on UK pension funds.
Performance evaluation requires the use of appropriate benchmarks. In general there are two
ways to construct benchmark portfolios. One way is to use risk factors, like equity/bond mar-
ket index returns, or the returns on specifically designed portfolios as in the Fama and French
methodology. Subsequently, the loading on these factors are found by regressing the returns on the
pension fund portfolio on these risk factor returns. The benchmark portfolio is then composed by
the estimated loadings and the returns on the risk factors. This is the approach taken in Coggin
et al. (1993), Tonks (2005), and Busse et al. (2006). The other way is to use explicit information
on the asset allocation holdings of a pension fund portfolio, as ?, Ippolito & Turner (1987), and
Blake et al. (1999). In that case the benchmark portfolio is calculated by multiplying the directly
measured weights with the associated returns on the individual asset classes.
There are two parameters in constructing a holding-based benchmark portfolio, the hold-
ings/allocations and the index returns to respective asset classes. The benchmark portfolio used in
both ? and Ippolito & Turner (1987) considers only three broad asset classes: stocks, bonds and
cash. However, nowadays the investment opportunities used by pension funds range over many
more asset categories, as was recognized by Blake et al. (1999). Though considering more asset
classes, Blake et al. (1999) apply the same index for a given asset class for all funds. The data set
in our empirical analysis holds more detailed information on different asset categories. In addition,
the index for each asset category differs across funds, which allows us to compute excess returns
more precisely.
Both ? and Blake et al. (1999) document underperformance with respect to the benchmark
portfolio. Ippolito & Turner (1987) finds mixed results depending on the choice of benchmark, but
4
shows that larger pension funds outperformed smaller funds substantially. These findings motivate
the formulation of similar hypotheses for the Dutch case in the z-score environment.
3 Investment process and the z-score
The investment process of a pension fund starts with an Asset Liability Management (ALM) study,
which results in an investment policy represented by a strategic asset allocation. From the strategic
asset allocation trustees define an annual investment plan, which specifies allocations for detailed
asset categories. Then trustees assign mandates for each asset category to a selected group of asset
managers. These managers can be either in-house or external, one or multiple, with passive or
active style. This paper looks at the quality of implementing the annual investment plan.
The success of implementation is measured by the differences between the actual returns and
the returns attainable from strict adherence to the annual investment plan. A benchmark portfolio
needs to be defined that represents the annual investment plan. This benchmark portfolio is a
hypothetical portfolio, which is ”structurally identical to the investment strategy without whatever
active management takes place” as defined in Logue & Rader (1998) (p168) or a ”passive mix with
the same style” as in Sharpe (1992). Our performance measure defines such a benchmark portfolio.
See the example in Table 3. The benchmark portfolio has a twofold purpose. First, the index
for each component portfolio is used by trustees to evaluate the performance of individual asset
managers for a particular asset class. Second, the overall return from the benchmark portfolio
serves as a return target. In our study we use the benchmark portfolio for its second purpose to
evaluate the quality of investment implementations by asset managers.
The remainder of this section introduces the performance measure we use in this paper. Since
1998 every Dutch mandatory industry-wide pension funds must compute a so-called z-score to
reflect their investment performance. The methodology of the z-score is set by Dutch law (Vri-
jstellingsbesluit Wet Bpf (2000)). The z-score is the difference between the actual return and the
return on a predefined benchmark portfolio, net of expenses, and normalized by the riskiness of the
5
Table 1: An example of a benchmark portfolio
This is a reproduction of a benchmark portfolio. It specifies the weighting and the indices used for
different investment styles. The range specifies the bound within which an active asset manager
must control the allocation. Source: 2006 annual report of the Agriculture and Food Supply Pension
Fund (www.iqinfo.com).
Assets Weight Range Index
Fixed income 75% 65%-85%
Governments 70% 60%-80% Citigroup Gov Bond Index
Corporates 15% 10%-20% Citigroup non-EGBI EMU index
Private Loans 15% 10%-20% Customized Private Loan Index
Equity 15% 5%-25%
Europe 40% 30%-50% MSCI Europe
USA 20% 10%-30% MSCI North America
Pacific 15% 5%-25% MSCI Pacific
EM Global 25% 15%-35% MSCI EM Global
Real estate 5,0% 0%-10%
Residential 50% 25%-75% ROZ- IPD Residential
Shops 50% 25%-75% ROZ- IPD Retail
Alternatives 5,0% 0%-10%
Commodities 50% 0%-100% DJ-AIG Commodity Index
Hedge Fund 50% 0%-100% Euro 7-day Libid
portfolio, as in the following equation:
zi,t =
(Rp,i,t − cp,i,t)− (Rb,i,t − cb,i,t)
Ei,t
where Rp,i,t and cp,i,t are the gross investment return and internal investment cost of pension fund
i at time t respectively. The internal investment cost also includes the fees paid to the external
asset managers and investment related custodian and administrative cost. Rb,i,t is the fund i’s
benchmark portfolio return using market indices in the respective asset categories at time t. See
Table 1 for an example. cb,i,t is the associated investment cost of the benchmark portfolio which
depends on the percentage of equity investment in the portfolio.5 The benchmark portfolio is
determined by trustees at the beginning of each year and fixed for one year. Specifically, the
weights and the index for various asset classes in the benchmark portfolio are defined a priori.
5This cost is presented in Vrijstellingsbesluit Wet Bpf (2000), and range from 0.10% to 0.22%. It varies to the
equity proportion of the pension portfolio.
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In addition the index should represent the asset class, be investable and objectively measurable.6
The benchmark return represents the return that an individual investor can obtain if he invests in
the benchmark portfolio, and the difference between the realized return and the benchmark return
reflects the excess return that a pension fund can earn by selecting the right internal or external
asset managers. The pre-selected benchmark portfolio also excludes the possibility of manipulation
in calculating the z-score.
To enable the comparison across pension funds with different investment strategies, the excess
returns are scaled by the riskiness of the asset mix in the benchmark portfolio (Ei,t). The asset
mix for this purpose contains two major categories: equity and fixed income (including cash). The
riskiness is measured by the variance of the benchmark portfolio return. According to Vrijstellings-
besluit Wet Bpf (2000), the riskiness of equity and fixed income investment is set at 2.6% and 0.6%.7
Nederlands Pensioen & Beleggingsnieuws (December 1, 2005) reports that these values are based
on the standard deviations of the realized excess returns on these asset categories. The standard
deviations are calculated by WM Company on the population of Dutch pension funds over the
period of 1992-1996. The risk parameters are kept fixed over subsequent years, and are used in
z-score calculations up to this day. The reported z-score is audited by external accountants.
The way the z-score is constructed reveals that it is not a measure to evaluate the effectiveness
of the investment plan, but rather a measure of the quality of implementing the investment plan.
The benchmark used in the calculation reflects the ex ante investment plan for a particular fund
for the upcoming year. Therefore the z-score accurately shows the fund’s ability in beating its
own benchmarks. A positive (negative) z-score means that the fund has successfully implemented
(failed to implement) its investment plan. This success (failure) can be attributed to a fund’s skill
in selecting and monitoring its asset managers. A high (low) z-score reflects the relatively good
(poor) ability of the fund in executing its investment plan.
The underlying arguments for the z-score are related to creating a standardized risk measure
that can be used by a regulator to judge whether a fund’s investment performance is sufficient.
6See Article 5.3 in Vrijstellingsbesluit Wet Bpf (2000).
7For example, if a fund has an asset mix of 60% equity and 40% fixed income, then Ei,t = 0.6∗2.6%+0.4∗0.6% =
1.8%.
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The statistical test, called performance test, is used to support this decision. In Vrijstellingsbesluit
Wet Bpf (2000) it is stated that if a fund falls to the lowest 10% percentile, measured over a period
of 5 years, its performance is regarded as insufficient. Based on the central limit theorem, the test




5, and is assumed to be asymptotically normally
distributed. The critical value of the test is -1.28, which corresponds to a confidence level of 90%
for a standardized normal distribution. If the test statistic is less than -1.28, the industry-wide
pension fund fails the performance test. The consequence of failing the performance test is that
the members of the industry fund have the right to leave the fund, i.e. they have the option join
another pension fund or establish their own.
We use the z-score to examine the quality of investment implementation by pension funds over
time and over funds (cross-sectionally). We realize that there are some serious concerns related to
the z-score performance test. A first concern is that the benchmark portfolio is a static benchmark,
in which the weighting of different asset styles is fixed for one year. As a result, the intertemporal
changes in the investment plan during the year cannot be captured by the benchmark portfolio
used in the z-score calculation. But, investment plan changes do change the return of the actual
benchmark portfolio. This can invalidate a fair evaluation of the implementation quality, because
part of the deviations is due to the change of the benchmark portfolio and has nothing to do with the
implementation ability of the selected asset managers. We believe the concern of a static benchmark
portfolio is more of a conceptual problem rather than a practical one due to the following practical
observations. Firstly, fixed weighting is a general rule, but the benchmark portfolio is allowed to
be changed once when there is a considerable change in the liability structure or the old investment
plan is obviously no longer appropriate for the fund.8 Secondly, changing the investment plan
during the year is more of a practice per Jan 1, 2007 when the regulation on financial assessment
is implemented, which requires the investment plan to match the market value of liabilities. Thus
during our sample period 1998-2006 we do not expect material changes in the investment plan
during the year.
8See Article 5.4 in Vrijstellingsbesluit Wet Bpf (2000)). As of November 1, 2007 funds are allowed to adjust their
norm portfolio twice a year. In addition, some funds, such as Pension fund ”Vervoer”, use a floating benchmark
moving with portfolio development.
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A second concern is the risk adjustment in the denominator of the z-score, where the riskiness
only considers equity and fixed income investments, which are kept fixed over time. The ignorance
of, for example, real estate investments might lead to improper risk adjustment for certain pension
funds. However, the z-score makes the risk adjustment at two levels. In addition to the risk
adjustment in the denominator, the benchmark portfolio in the numerator adjusts the risk in,
for example real estate, by integrating the excess returns in the equity asset class (see Table 1).
Insofar as the standard deviations of the excess returns on real estate are not that different from
the standard deviations on equity excess returns the bias in the risk measure is limited.
Another concern is the moral hazard issue arising from the fixed values of 2.6 and 0.6 as the
riskiness of the equity and fixed income investments, where pension funds can take advantage in
calculating their scores. If a fund takes more risks than what is assumed in the benchmark, its
z-score can be inflated. This can cause a problem if we find outperformance for the average pension
fund because the outperformance can be driven by higher risk exposures in the pension industry
than their benchmark portfolios would indicate. On the other hand it would not be an issue if
no outperformance is detected. Cross sectionally, if a fund takes a higher excessive risk over its
own benchmark than another fund, this risk-taking strategy will give this fund an advantage in the
z-score ranking. However, a higher z-score does not necessarily mean that the fund takes higher
excessive risk over the benchmark, because there are other factors that could explain the higher
performance. We realize that excessive risk exposures constitute a limitation of using z-scores as a
measure for explaining cross sectional outperformance.
4 Data
We use the annual report information from publications of the Dutch industry-wide pension fund
association.9 In addition we obtain data from pensioninfo which collects and composes aggregate
financial information of companies and organizations including pension funds.10 We merged and
verified data from both sources. When there is a discrepancy between the z-scores from the two
9In Dutch this association is called the Vereniging van Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen (VB). See their website at
www.vb.nl.
10See their website at http://www.iqinfo.com.
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sources, we used the z-score reported in a fund’s annual report.
Our sample runs from 1998 through 2006 and covers the entire population of mandatory
industry-wide pension funds.11 We do not use the data for 2007 and later years, because in 2007
pension funds are required to value their liabilities at market prices. The new regulation causes
many funds to change their investment plans or benchmark portfolios during the year. This change
in the investment plan itself is often not accounted for in the benchmark portfolio when the z-score
is computed. As a result the z-score can be an inaccurate measure of excess returns over the
benchmark portfolio after January 1, 2007.
Over the sample period, the number of funds varies between 59-65 for a number of reasons. Some
funds either entered the industry category or became mandatory after 1998, two funds merged, and
two funds were sold to insurance companies. In the end, we have a balanced sample of 57 funds
reporting z-scores. No funds have become non-compulsory or cease during our sample period and
thus our sample does not suffer from survivorship bias.
Since there is no considerable change in the relative sizes of the pension funds in our sample,
we use the number of total participants in 2006 as a proxy for the fund size. We also use the value
of total invested assets in 2006 as an alternative measure, and find all results maintain. This is
also confirmed by the correlation coefficient of 0.88 between the two measures. The size data is
obtained from the 2006 annual reports of all pension funds and shown in Table 2. The smallest
fund in the sample has an amount of 2579 participants, and the largest fund has 2.657 million
participants. In terms of invested assets, the smallest fund is e40.9 million, the largest is e208.9
billion. Both measures reflect a large size spread among Dutch pension funds. Figure 1 shows that
the distribution of total participants is skewed with a long right tail. Many funds are relatively
small, with a small number of large funds with more than 1 million participants.
11According to DNB 2007 statistics there are 71 mandatory industry-wide pension funds including 7 pre-pension
funds which provide pensions for early retirement. Only mandatory funds are required to report z-scores.
10
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of pension fund size
Descriptive statistics of fund sizes measured respectively by total invested assets, total number of
participants, and the logarithm value of the total participants.
invested assets (billion euro) total participants log (total participants)
Minimum 0.04 2,579 3.41
Maximum 208.9 2,657,000 6.42
Mean 7.2 211,630 4.70
Std. Deviation 2.96 479,130 0.69
5 Empirical results
The z-score is based on the fund-specific benchmark portfolio and reflects a fund’s ability in beat-
ing its own ex ante benchmarks. Descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that throughout the sam-
ple period the average z-score varies around 0 suggesting that the z-score measures out/under-
performance.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the z-scores
Descriptive statistics for the z-scores of Dutch industry-wide pension funds over the period of
1998-2006. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
t-Statistics on the bottom line indicate whether the mean z-score for each year and for the pooled
sample is different from 0.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Pooled
Mean 0.26** 0.27** 0.29*** 0.08 -0.89*** 0.14 -0.39*** 0.30 *** 0.30*** 0.03
Med. 0.14 0.19 0.28 -0.08 -1.00 0.04 -0.39 0.25 0.14 0.02
Max. 2.25 3.43 3.44 3.84 0.80 1.74 1.34 2.30 2.27 3.84
Min. -3.07 -1.22 -1.59 -2.25 -2.91 -1.14 -1.79 -0.87 -0.58 -3.07
Std. 0.89 0.92 0.81 0.90 0.80 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.84
Skew -0.38 0.84 0.59 0.98 -0.26 0.67 0.16 1.15 1.03 0.22
Kurt 5.65 4.20 6.17 6.98 3.31 4.23 3.79 4.85 4.41 5.29
Obs. 59 59 60 61 62 63 65 64 62 555
t-stat 2.21 2.25 2.75 0.69 -8.83 1.98 -5.67 3.90 4.26 0.97
We perform a t-test to examine whether the average z-scores are different from zero. During
the period of 1998 through 2000 and the period of 2005 and 2006, the average z-score is positive
at 5% significance level, while in 2002 and 2004 the average z-score is negative. This seems to
suggest that the performance of pension funds as measured by the z-score fluctuates considerably
over time. Given the construction of the z-score it is not clear however, whether this performance
can be attributed to true skill or incomplete risk adjustment. The pooled average z-score is not
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Figure 1: Size histogram of 57 pension funds in 2006
This figure draws the histogram of 57 pension funds based on the amount of their total participants
in 2006.
significantly different from 0, which indicates that over a long period pension funds as a group do
not outperform their benchmarks significantly. This result is in line with the limited selection and
timing abilities of asset managers by pension fund trustees documented in Goyal & Wahal (2008).
5.1 Performance persistence
The descriptive statistics show that the average pension fund is not able to beat its benchmark
over time. In this section we focus on the performance persistence of the pension funds in our
sample. In mutual fund research most studies indicate that there is no performance persistence.12
12Among others see Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Bollen & Busse (2001). Some recent studies though point
out short-run persistence when using daily and monthly returns and certain performance measures such as Bollen &
12
As discussed in Berk & Green (2004), within a rational market framework, this is due to the free
movement of competitive capital. In the pension fund industry, however, mandates stay with one
asset manager often more than two years. There is no competitive supply of capital to pension
asset managers, which may lead to some performance persistence. Below we present a number of
ways to explore whether performance persistence can be detected in our sample using the z-score
as a performance measure. In these tests we use a balanced sample of 57 funds with a complete set
of reported z-scores in all 9 years.
Like many other financial data sets in asset pricing our data set of z-scores is characterized
by cross-sectional correlation among the error terms when regressing current performance on past
performances. We apply the two-step regression procedure of Fama & MacBeth (1973) in order to
correct for cross-sectional error correlation in a panel setting. Table 3 indicates that in a certain
year when the z-score of one fund is unusably high, the z-score of another fund is also likely to
be high, i.e. there are positive correlations among z-scores. Therefore a pooled times-series cross-
section regression is not suitable in analyzing our data. See also Cochrane (2001) and Petersen
(2009).
We first run cross-sectional regressions of the current z-scores on the past z-scores on a yearly
basis as in
zi,t = at + btzi,t−1 + εi,t, i = 1, . . . , 57, t = 1999, . . . , 2006.
over the period 1999-2006. Using standard OLS we obtain a time series of the slope coefficient
estimates (b̂t) for 8 years. Then we perform a t-test on the average estimated coefficient, shown
in Panel A of Table 4. This number (b̂t = 0.07) indicates that past z-scores are positively related
to current z-scores, but not in a statistically significant way. We conclude that pension funds as a
group do not show performance persistence.
We also performed a Spearman rank correlation test for persistence, which does not require a
distributional assumption. Each year we rank the funds based on their z-scores. The Spearman
Busse (2005) and Huij & Verbeek (2007).
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Table 4: Persistence tests based on regression and ranking
Panel A reports the slope coefficients (b̂t) from the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regression zi,t =
at + btzi,t−1 + εi,t for each year t = 1999 − 2006. b̂t is the averaged value over time of the b̂t
coefficients. Panel B reports the Spearman rank correlation coefficient over time. t-statistics are
within parentheses.
Panel A: Regression
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
b̂t -0.39 -0.17 -0.10 0.27 -0.13 0.28 0.27 0.50
b̂t 0.07 (0.62)
Panel B: Ranking
Year ’98-’99 ’99-’00 ’00-’01 ’01-’02 ’02-’03 ’03-’04 ’04-’05 ’05-’06
ρt,t−1 -0.19 -0.28 -0.02 0.22 -0.29 0.15 0.15 0.44
ρt,t−1 0.02 (0.24)













i,t,t−1 is the sum of squared differences of ranks over two consecutive years for all
funds. N = 57 is the number of funds/ranks in our sample. For our 9-year sample, we obtain a
time series of correlation coefficients for 8 years. As in the previous regression test, we apply a
t-test using the average and the standard deviation of the time series, shown in Panel B of Table
4. We find again that the average coefficient (ρt,t−1=0.02) is not significantly different from zero,
corroborating our earlier result using the Fama-MacBeth method.
The results from the Fama-MacBeth regressions may be influenced by outliers. One way to
deal with this is to construct fund groups based on their past performance as in Fama & French
(1992). Subsequently, we can analyze the performance on these sorted fund groups. Specifically,
every year 3 fund groups are formed based on their z-scores in the previous year. Then for each
individual group the current average z-score is computed. Repeating this for each year, we obtain a
times series of average z-scores for the 3 fund groups. These are reported in panel A of Table 5. If
performance is persistent, the best-performing fund group should provide the best performance in
the subsequent years again. However, our results show that in some years the best performing group
from the past year provides the worst performance in this year. For example, the best performing
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fund group in 1998 becomes the worst in 1999, having an average z-score of -0.10. The paired
sample t-tests reported in Panel B show that none of the test statistics is statistically different from
zero. This again confirms that there is no persistence in pension fund performance over time.13
Table 5: Persistence test based on fund groups
Panel A reports the z-score in each year of a fund group formed on their previous year’s z-scores.
Panel B reports the paired sample t-test for mean differences. With a degrees of freedom equal to
7, critical values of 10%(*), 5%(**), 1%(***) significance level are 1.42, 1.90, and 3 respectively.
Panel A z-scores of 3 fund groups
Performance rank (t-1) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Top (past best) -0.10 0.17 0.05 -0.73 0.08 -0.28 0.51 0.80
Mid 0.56 0.20 0.09 -1.02 -0.02 -0.32 0.32 0.00
Bottom (past worst) 0.36 0.46 -0.09 -0.96 0.32 -0.42 0.14 0.06
Panel B Paired sample t-tests
Mean of paired difference Std. Deviation t-stat
Top - Mid 0.08 0.40 0.59
Mid - Bottom -0.01 0.21 -0.08
Top - Bottom 0.08 0.39 0.56
In order to better understand the non-persistence results so far, we look further into the com-
position of the fund groups over time by applying the ideas from Fama & French (2007). These
authors investigate how individual firms migrate from one portfolio to another over time and study
its contribution to the cross-section returns. Each column in Table 6 reports the percentages of
funds in the current group that originated from the previous year’s top, mid and bottom fund
groups, respectively.
We find that funds are not ”sticky” to their group, and move considerably among the top,
mid and bottom groups. For example, of the current top group, 30% are funds that were in the
previous year’s bottom group, and another 30% come from the mid group of the previous year. Of
the current bottom group, 31% and 42% are the funds from the past top and the past mid group
respectively. We test the hypothesis of random migration of funds among the three groups. The
null hypothesis is that the migration probabilities are all equal to 1/3. The test statistics show
that for six out of the nine possible migrations we cannot reject the hypothesis at a 5% significance
level. Among the other three migrations, either past poor performing funds tend to move up in
13We also performed the analysis based on 5 fund groups (available upon request), but the results do not change.
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Table 6: Migration statistics
This table reports fund migrations among groups sorted on performance. Every year funds are
assigned to top, mid and bottom groups respectively according to their z-scores in that year. The
column shows the composition of the current group that comes from the past top, mid or bottom
group respectively. In brackets are the t-statistics testing whether the percentage is equal to 3313%
for a sample of 57 funds. With a degrees of freedom equal to 7, critical values of 10%(*), 5%(**),
1%(***) significance level are 1.42, 1.90, and 3 respectively.
Fund groups based on current performance
Groups based on past performance Top mid Bottom
Top 40%(0.95) 29%(-1.27) 31%(-0.43)
Mid 30%(-1.00) 28% (-1.20) 42%(2.02**)
Bottom 30%(-0.46) 43% (1.96**) 27% (-1.68*)
Total 1 1 1
the next year, or past mediocre funds tend to move downward in the next year. Our inability
to reject the null hypothesis of random migration indicates that performance persistence does not
exist in our sample. In an unreported table we also examine the contribution of migrated funds
to the z-scores.14 We find in many situations a large part of the z-score of a bottom group is
contributed by the funds that used to be in the top group, while the top group obtains a large
chunk of its z-score from the funds that used to in the bottom group. Such dramatic changes of
performance attribution between years reflect that past performance does not tell us much about
future performance. In sum, the migration analysis underlines the lack of performance persistence
that we found earlier.
5.2 Performance and fund size
The analysis so far shows that the Dutch industry-wide pension funds as a whole do not show
any out- or under-performance with respect to their benchmarks. This, however, does not mean a
subgroup may outperform another subgroup. Thus it is interesting to investigate the cross-sectional
difference among funds. Ambachtsheer, Capelle & Scheibelhut (1998) examine 80 US and Canadian
pension funds for the period 1993-1996 and find that large fund size is an important driver for high
investment performance. Reasons are that a large size brings economies of scale in operating cost
and enables funds to support a full-time professional management team. Following these arguments
14This table is available upon request.
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Table 7: Pension fund performance and size
Panel A regresses the time-average z-score on the fund’s size. Panel B regresses the z-score on
fund size on a yearly basis. In both cases, the fund size is measured by the logarithm of a fund’s
total participants in 2006 including active and inactive participants and retirees. (***) indicates a
significant level of 1%.
Panel A: Regressing on time-average z-scores
Variable Coef. t-Statistic
Log(number of participants) 0.18 4.86***
Adjusted R-squared 0.27
Panel B: Regressing on annual z-scores each year
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
beta 0.02 0.16 0.19 -0.05 0.49 -0.03 0.27 0.29 0.32
t-stat 0.11 0.88 1.19 -0.36 3.49*** -0.32 2.56*** 2.49*** 3.09***
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.15
we test whether fund size might be a differentiating factor in performance for our sample.
In order to measure the effect of size on the z-score of a fund we perform two cross-sectional
regressions. The first regression takes the average z-score of a fund over time as the dependent
variable and the second set of regressions performs this regression on an annual basis. Size is
measured by the logarithm of the total number of participants in a fund in 2006, including active
and inactive participants and retirees (see also Figure 1). Panel A in Table 7 shows that size
indeed matters. Size alone explains 27% of the variation in averaged fund z-scores. Moreover, the
coefficient is positive, i.e. larger funds have a higher z-score than smaller funds on average. This
result is consistent with earlier findings in the literature on pension fund investment performance.
Goyal & Wahal (2008) study the decision of hiring and firing asset managers in US pension funds.
They find that fund size can explain the post-hiring excess returns, and suggest that large size
allows pension fund sponsors to develop expertise in selecting asset managers. Bauer et al. (2007)
study the mandate size of delegated portfolios in pension funds. They find size is not a factor
driving the benchmark adjusted net return, but size does bring economies of scale in reducing costs
of external managers. Both these reasonings support our findings on size, but we cannot distinguish
which of these explanations would apply to our findings.
We also performed regressions of the z-score on the fund’s size on a yearly basis. Panel B in
Table 7 shows that only in the years 2002, and 2004 till 2006 size has some explanatory power. In
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Table 8: Average z-score of size groups over time
Panel A reports the equally-weighted z-score of each size group. Since relative fund size does not
change over time, the five size groups are based on the number of total participants in 2006. Panel
B reports the paired sample t-test for the z-score difference between the largest size group and
the smallest size group. With a degrees of freedom equal to 8, critical values of 10%, 5%, 1%
significance level are 1.40, 1.86, and 2.90, respectively. (*)(**)(***) indicates a significant level at
10%, 5% and 1%.
Panel A 3 size groups
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1(largest) 0.38 0.35 0.49 0.16 -0.43 -0.09 -0.20 0.53 0.45
2 0.25 0.11 0.37 -0.32 -1.04 0.33 -0.39 0.26 0.31
3 (smallest) 0.22 0.36 -0.02 0.20 -1.24 0.14 -0.43 0.18 0.10
Panel B Paired sample t-test
Mean of paired difference 0.19
t-stat 2.03**
order to get more information on why this might occur we again construct a number of size-based
fund groups, and examine their performance over time.
Table 8 reports the average z-scores of three size groups (Panel A). Each group contains a
similar number of funds. There is a clear difference in the z-scores between the largest and the
smallest size group. This is confirmed by the paired sample t-tests in Panel B. From Panel A it
can be seen that there are non-monotonous performance patterns among groups in different years.
For example, in the year 2003, the middle-sized group outperforms the other groups. And in 1999
and 2001 the smaller funds had the best performance.15
Although performance is not monotonously increasing with size, we do see (panel B) that the
largest size group outperforms the smallest group on average. To relieve the concern over the power
of the t-test in this relatively small sample, we also perform a Wilcoxon signed rank test, which is
more robust for small samples. Again, this test indicates that largest funds outperform smallest
ones. Our results are consistent with the findings on US and Canadian pension funds in Bauer
et al. (2007) that size is an important factor explaining pension fund investment performance.16
15As shown in Figure 1, the size distribution is skewed with a tail to the right, suggesting that most funds are
small except a few extremely large funds. We adapted the construction of size groups by removing some outliers or
forming unbalanced size groups such as categories based on total assets with unequal number of funds, to reflect this
size asymmetry. We find that our results and conclusions do not change. These tables are available upon request.
16We also investigated whether there exists outperformance in the largest size group and underperformance in
the smallest size group. We split our sample into subgroups in terms of size as measured by the amount of total
participants. We redo the tests on average z-scores, the Fama-MacBeth regressions and the Spearman rank correlation
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The drivers behind the size effect cannot be investigated in this paper due to limitations of our
data. The existing literature provides several explanations such as negotiation power in lowering
costs, reputation effect, better monitoring of asset managers, or more expertise in selecting superior
asset managers. Bikker, Broeders, Hollanders & Ponds (2009) show that larger pension funds invest
more in risky assets than smaller funds, which implies that larger funds earn higher expected returns
than smaller funds. In our paper it is impossible to investigate this explanation due to the lack of
data on asset allocations in both the benchmark (ex ante) as well as the realized (ex post) portfolio.
As a result, we cannot check whether the prescribed risk correction in the z-score appropriately
corrects for the risk that pension funds take. However, as the ex ante benchmark constructions
and the subsequent z-score calculations are audited by external supervisors, this provides some
confidence that the reported z-scores do reflect some important and valuable information about
the performance of pension funds.
6 Concluding remarks
One of the main tasks of pension fund trustees is to design an investment strategy that is consistent
with the short and long term goals of the fund, and to implement this strategy effectively. This paper
focuses on the investment implementation capabilities of pension fund trustees of Dutch sectorial
pension funds. We investigate the added value of pension funds in delegating and monitoring their
investment activities. For this purpose we use the z-score that Dutch mandatory industry-wide
pension funds are obliged to publish in order to show their net-of-fees investment performance
relative to an a priori self-selected benchmark. The risk correction of the z-score is based on the ex
ante benchmark composition, but the standard deviations on the excess returns are fixed by law.
The scores intend to reflect the implementation quality of the strategic asset allocation.
Compared with retail investors, pension funds are more resourceful in carrying out an investment
strategy. They can receive extensive help from advisors and consultants, gain valuable information
before making the decisions, and can establish desired procedures to monitor the investment process.
tests for all the subgroups. The results show that there is no out- or under-performance and no performance persistence
for all size subgroups. This indicates that our earlier result on the size effect is not affected by specific performance
results in the subgroups. Results are available upon request.
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We would expect that pension fund trustees are able to select and recruit a superior group of
internal and/or external asset managers and establish effective investment management procedures
to encourage their asset managers to beat the pre-agreed benchmarks. The inconvenience of moving
a large amount of pension assets across different asset managers or asset categories may also predict
some type of performance persistence.
We have studied and reported z-scores on a comprehensive and unique data set of industry-wide
pension funds in the Netherlands. We find that pension funds do not outperform their benchmarks
consistently over time. In addition to annual performance tests, we also included a test to check
whether funds showed performance persistence by analyzing whether funds moved (migrated) from
one performance group to another. This migration test showed that the null hypothesis of random
movement of funds from one group to another could not be rejected, thereby suggesting that any
performance persistence is absent in our sample. All these tests imply that pension funds on average
do not add additional investment value in implementing their investment plans. This conclusion
also holds when we sort the pension funds into three equally-sized groups based on the total number
of associated participants (active, inactive and retirees).
However, we do find that the largest funds perform significantly better than smaller funds when
measured over the whole sample 1999-2006. This might be attributed to factors like economies
of scale in costs, expertise in asset manager selection, or effective monitoring of asset managers.
However, more detailed data on the composition of pension fund asset portfolios is needed to
substantiate the validity of these arguments. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with the
empirical trend of smaller pension funds merging with, or being acquired by, bigger funds in order
to improve their investment performance.
All our results are based on the z-score as a performance measure. However, the construction of
the z-score raises some doubts on using this measure as a proper investment performance measure.
Especially the risk correction based on only two investment categories (equity and fixed income)
is rather naive. The academic literature has proposed a large number of performance measures
that could improve the risk correction. Also, the rather static implementation of the z-score at a
yearly basis should be reassessed as well. We realize that our results may be influenced by these
20
aspects, but we also stress that industry-wide pension funds in the Netherlands need to report their
investment performance in the same manner. As the z-score is prescribed by Dutch law, and failing
the performance test may have severe consequences for individual pension funds, it seems strange
that the shortcomings of the z-score methodology have not attracted much more attention.
The credit crisis in 2008 has hit the Dutch pension fund severely and many funds became
underfunded. Some funds even had to cut nominal benefits. This has raised more attention to
manage mismatch risk between liabilities and assets rather than financial asset performance alone.
Liability-driven investment is being considered more and more. This leads to investment perfor-
mance being more and more evaluated against liabilities rather than against financial benchmarks.
No doubt the z-score initiated in the late 1990s has served the purpose of measuring the investment
performance across pension funds for the period between late 1990s and early 2000s. However, with
changes in the demographic structure, the regulatory and accounting environment, a more advanced
performance measurement measure is needed. In this light, and also including the methodological
issues raised above, we expect that the use of the z-score in evaluating the pension fund investment
performance will lose its attractiveness.
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